The Economic Behavior of the Puerto Rico
Medical Services Administration: A Function of its Dynamic Technical and Social Changes in the
existing Organizational Architecture, embedded within the Healthcare, Financial,
Academic, and Political Macro Ecosystems
"The intellect has little to do on the road
to discovery. There comes a leap in consciousness, call it intuition or what
you will, and the solution comes to you and you don't know how or why." Albert
Einstein
Nilza I. Cruz Ruiz
Former General Administrator
PR Medical Services Administration
(ASEM)
May, 2016 - Short Summary
Executive Summary
Puerto Rico is facing a healthcare affordability defining moment within the Commonwealth’s Economic Crisis. Healthcare industry stakeholders are striving to pay climbing healthcare costs. Hospitals are being forced to make difficult financial choices. The island’s age growing population is going without the needed care. As a direct result, many health professionals, and a significant patient segment, which depends on government health care services are migrating to the mainland.
Young Puerto Ricans are frustrated by limited job prospects on an island that has staggering unemployment at over 12 percent. It is more than double the mainland’s rate even before the governor’s announcement in June 2015 of an unpayable $72 billion public debt. “Experts say the situation is not as simple as a brain drain”. “It’s not just an outmigration of the most-educated people. It’s an outmigration of workers,” said Mark Hugo Lopez, the director of Hispanic Research at the Pew Research Center, “and that’s true of people who might be doctors or lawyers but also true of people who might be technicians, engineers or truck drivers.”
The Puerto Rico Medical Complex, which
is composed of tertiary and above tertiary hospitals, outpatient clinics,
Comprehensive Cancer Research Center, the University of Puerto Rico Medical
Science Campus, and other medical facilities, is spearheaded by the
Administration of Medical Services of Puerto Rico (hereinafter: ASEM). It is
the appointed landlord of the donated real estate under which the Complex is
instituted. Classified as a “Business
Type Activity” within the Commonwealth’s executive and financial structure. This
fund accounts for the operations associated with providing support through
centralized health infrastructure services to the hospitals within the complex
(hereinafter: Participating Institutions). Examples are: diet, laundry,
instrument sterilization, security, emergency room, operating rooms, blood
bank, ancillary services, and outpatient services. Infrastructure is defined by
the economic and additional resources associated with physical facilities,
human capital, materials, equipment, information technology, utilities, and
standard operating procedures, among others. Governance and internal politics
are in-built within the structure.
ASEM operates under the legal base of
Law No. 66, June 1978, repealing previous Law 54 of 1957. The
legislative history shows that Law 54 was amended due to the escalating debts of the participating institutions and
the inability (governance) of the Corporation’s Board of Directors (which was
mainly composed by the directors of the
participating institutions) to resolve the situation of billing and paying
between themselves. ASEM’s fiscal situation was intended to be solved by the
implementation of this measure. This, by transferring ample decision making
"powers" to the Secretary of Health (except for regulation) and establishing
payment safeguards amongst other controls of financial nature. Nevertheless,
this objective’s achievement was unsuccessful.
One of the elements with
"claws" incorporated into this new law, motivated by the severity of
the debt in the effect was positioned in Article 13. Among other things, it set out for the
Secretary of Treasury to send ASEM at the beginning of each fiscal year total
funds commensurate to the amount the participating institutions certify they would
consume during said year. Further, it authorized the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to carry out transfers to ASEM in case of defaults
due to insufficient funds by the institutions.
So, given the accelerated growth
resulting from the gathering of economic commitments between ASEM, its vendors,
government agencies, ASEM Institutions accounts receivable, and particularly,
since 1997, the effect of the Government Health Reform, insurance contractual
adjustments and uncollected payments from non insureds, economic conditions
worsened again. By this time, in order to temporarily alleviate the financial
situation, Act No. 174 of 2010 was approved. This allowed ASEM to incur in obligations
up to 285 million dollars to pay their debts, improve physical facilities and
provide liquidity for operations. The Act identified the Government General
Fund as payment for the line of credit. It was also guaranteed by collateral and ASEM
would report GDB financials on a monthly basis through Fiscal Oversight
Agreement statements in addition to operational measures as aggressive
collecting efforts and obtaining operating efficiencies. To date, since the
organizational structure remains the same, the adverse economic behavior has
continued to grow exponentially.
As a consequence of ASEM’s evolution, the
only trauma hospital in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean is encompassed under its governance
through Law 101 of 1965. Therefore, the two main sources of revenue for ASEM
are centralized health infrastructure services vended to participating institutions
which constitute 71% or $96 million of its net service revenue, and reimbursements
collected from contracted insurers and/or self- insured patients for health
related services provided through the emergency room, trauma hospital, and outpatient
facilities. These represent 29% or $40 million of annual net revenues (audited
results, Fiscal Year 14-15).
ASEM also provides its medical facility
infrastructure as teaching and research resources for the Medical Science
Campus attending doctors and residents.
From the business standpoint, 6 (six)
out of (8) eight or 75% of ASEM participating institution consumers represent
99% or $97 million of this segments cash revenue influx for projected FY 15-16.
Historically this has been the trend. Four (4) of these institutions, which represent
$88 million are under the authority of the Department of Health (the Department
itself, a substantial Consumer). Since services provided under the Department
are classified as government activities, they are mainly subsidized by the
commonwealth’s general fund which is under significant financial constraint. Therefore,
disbursements of dollar amounts are restrained. As a result, their inability to
pay ASEM for acquired support centralized services is increasing. While the remaining participating institutions
are government corporations and a non-profit organization, their capacity to
meet with a balanced budget is adverse. Monthly cash generated by the
participating institutions line of business is projected at an average of $8.2
million for FY 15-16. With regards to patient service revenue, fifty three
percent (53%) of ASEMs patients are insured by the government (Health Reform
and ACAA). Forty percent (40%) represents health reform. Existing ARRA
(American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) funding and financial disorder,
amongst other factors are a threat, and may impact this portion of the aggregate.
Monthly cash generated by the patient service revenue line of business is
projected at an average of $2.7 million for FY 15-16, for which $1.8 million or
67% are collected from the government (ASES (Health Reform) and ACAA). Said
factors contribute to the weakness of ASEM’s liquidity, net position, and debt
accumulation. Core infrastructure deterioration is also manifested. This
directly jeopardizes revenue generation for both lines of business. Examples
are worsened operating rooms, instrument sterilization system, laundry and diet.
Indirect costs associated with increased risk exposures are linked with
infection control and joint commission standard compliance.
ASEM’s cash position may continue to
fail exponentially for the following reasons:
1) Lack of customer diversification - 99%
of participating institutions are financed by the government.
2) Revenue Influx Mix - 79% or $96mm of
ASEMs net service revenue relies on participating institutions.
3) Inability of Payment - due to 1) and
2) and the Commonwealth economic crisis impact.
4) Public policy related to the
caregiving of uninsureds, John Doe and alien patients.
5) Universal Third Party Payer System
model for insured patients.
6) Lack of tertiary an above tertiary
health structure amongst private hospitals in PR. 41% of patients received
through the ASEM emergency Room are transfers from private hospitals.
7) Uncompensated health care costs
triggered by health services provided to uninsured patients (average of 10 million/year), contractual
adjustment (average 57%) and bad debts (Average 4 million/year).
8) Insured Patient Mix – 53% of
patients are insured by the government.
Furthermore, the 8 (eight) consumers
(including the Department of Health) within the Medical Center Complex are
independently governed. Three (3) governed by the Department of Health: University
District Hospital, Pediatric Hospital, and the Administration for Services of
Mental Health and Against Addiction (ASSMCA). One (1) is the Department of Health. One (1) governed by the municipality
of San Juan: Municipal Hospital. Two (2) corporations:
Cardiovascular Center, and Industrial Hospital (under the State Insurance Fund
Corporation). One (1) governed under a non-profit organization: Oncological
Hospital.
Within the Medical Center Complex
hospitals including Trauma, there are approximately 1,056 beds with an average
occupancy of 68%. Because of independent governance as a result of the existing
organizational architecture, beds are not shared. This represents an example of
the fact that there is great opportunity to improve efficiency and
effectiveness. Without a dramatic transformation of the actual Macro Healthcare
Ecosystem and the Medical Center Complex, PR will continue to spend superior dollar
amounts on increasing health related costs, rather than readdressing capital in
preventive, and individual planning healthcare, targeting social, and rehabilitation
factors. This, combined with an effective financial structure reconceptualization
(from fee for service to value based healthcare).
Even though ASEM’s FY 14-15 audited financial statement show a net operating revenue increase of 11% or $13 million, expense decrease of 5% or $9 million, and operating loss decrease of 34% or $22 million compared to FY 13-14, its current organizational architecture and financial structure will promote increasingly untenable financial results in the next six (6) months if a transformation of impact does not occur. Accounts receivable accumulated projection to June, 2016 is $65 million. This includes the department of health ($7million), other participating institutions ($37 million), health plan uncompensated costs (20.3 million) and other ($700 thousand). The accumulated accounts payable projection to June, 2016 escalates to a staggering $487.6 million. This amount includes the Government Development Bank (GDB) debt which has increased from $283 million in November, 2010 to $312.5 million including interests. ASEM’s dependence on the General Fund will only increase.
This paper suggests, that in order to
change the adverse economic behavior, which proves to be a trend for at least
the past 20 (twenty) years, the existing organization should be transformed.
It also explains and proves
comprehensively, how, through the introduction and deployment of the Business
Oversight Model: “Hacia la Re conceptualización Del Centro Medico de Puerto
Rico…” improved financial results, operational efficiencies, and social /
behavioral changes have been achieved. But they will not be sustained, if the existing structure
and healthcare public policies persist.
The model prompts that the interrelations/or
non-interrelations fostered within
its core dominant factors, living variables, and external healthcare, fiscal,
academic and political ecosystems would produce commensurate economic results.
It interrelates clinical, operational, financial, and social data in order to
gather meaningful figures proportionate with the risk scenario, driven by
patient requirements. Analysis of information and social behavior would then be
introduced into the organization’s architecture and used to perform simulations
to ensure
continuous operational and financial improvement. This,
while upholding patient wellbeing and satisfaction.
The proficiency of the model would
require the existing structure to be transmuted, within a parallel revolution
of the mentioned macro ecosystems. It is not meant to “survive” working
independently, as neither is ASEM.
The following charts show historical
financial results (based on audited financial statements FY 1993 – 2015):
Achieving sustainability should
include, but not be limited to a transformed macro integrated
healthcare prevention system. Factors to be evaluated should include the
development and retention of healthcare professionals, transformed economic structure
incorporating alternate models within the insurance company third party payer
system (especially for the existing Health Reform model), and strategies to
promote economic development through medical tourism, research, development,
and academic exchanges, for example.
The financial crisis Puerto Rico is
facing is positively correlated to a continuously growing negative economy for
at least the past twelve years, a population in which more than 50% is under
the level of poverty, facing threatening diseases and aging. Data intelligence is critical. Intelligence
structures need to enhance information interaction and promote sustained
technological innovation.
I do have to strive on the fact that being part of the
Puerto Rico Administration Medical Center executive team as General Administrator
for the past 3.5 years has been a true professional challenge, but at the same time, it’s been a fulfilling
experience providing the utmost opportunity of being part of the Medical
Center Community. But what does this really mean? Well, it’s hard to
express in words, but I’ll try:
Facilitating coworkers at all levels, mourning with expired
and grave patient relatives, praying with them, and sharing their faith; have
made all the difference! I was part of
the Ecosystem.
Having the opportunity to talk with the indigent and
discovering they’re really special! The
passion we see on a day to day basis, from our surgeons, those so well educated
professionals, that are by far focused on saving lives, on making a difference,
on making us and the population understand how important prevention is… for the
sake of our lives, is simply contagious.
All of the above,
really make every hour, every difficult managerial decision, any daily work
frustration just transform into a smile… And the feeling of satisfaction… of
giving, of understanding tomorrow one can be the one involved or hurt in a
serious accident, (that’s called empathy),
well… no words to describe.
Internal Politics, governance issues, a full array of
colorful personalities, very complex historical issues, to say
the least, well yes, they definitely exist and the culture and behavior are
also unique. They represent the evolution of the existing system throughout
more than fifty (50) years.
But none of the working or professional environments which
I’ve been part of: VP positions in multinational insurance companies, or Boards
of Directors, have provided me with the chance to study and observe closely and
personally, the real interrelation and results, of living variables, as I refer
to at the beginning of this paper; along with their co-existence and mutations
in the Medical Center environment.
Anecdotes related to my first meetings can be shared. I
would ask questions, looking for answers based on facts, on empirical data, but
no! Answers began with phrases like “I think,” “I understand”, “this should be”
or “I was told…”. In addition, departments worked totally independent, and
focused on the day to day “problems” of their “small world” or their respective
areas, or their perspectives, but they did not see how ASEM should produce
results systemically, as a whole, and the fact that everything revolved around
a patient centered ecosystem!
Having many individual pieces called results. Well, this
simply was part of the culture, and sincerely, during these initial months it
was complex, to the least. What would this imply in terms of measurements, data
intelligence, and decision making? It was scary. And in 2016, just the
beginning.
This did not apply to all coworkers, but for many. It was the
architecture of the system, the living variables coexistence, mutations produced,
and non-evolution and/or counter evolution throughout many years! The problem
was not only technical as to “fixing” the
economic behavior of ASEM, but has to be addressed integrating the social and
behavior factors as well.
And so, the first opportunity was identified: understanding
the organization, the underlying structure, and the results, the culture, and
people behavior.
The answer: The Introduction of the new Systemic Oversight
Business Model: “Hacia la
Re conceptualización del Centro Medico de Puerto Rico…”
As to our initial Hypothesis:
The data and information provided throughout this paper, suggests
the hypothesis proves to be true. Many efforts impacting operational,
technical, social, and behavioral components within the existing Organizational
Architecture, and Financial Structure, were addressed based on the introduction
and deployment of the new Transformed Management Oversight and Fiscal Control
Platform. This dominant factor promoted
a direct impact within the described “living variables”, upholding positive change
in ASEM’s immediate Economic Behavior. But because the Organizational
Architecture and Financial Structure remain the same within also non-impacted
Healthcare, Economic, Academic and Political Ecosystems; no transformation has
occurred. Improved economic behavior will not be sustained, and will fall into
de category of temporary remedies. But, the ASEM Top Management team alone
cannot perform the much needed transformation.
In order to Transform the existing organization and promote sustained
Economic Behavior impact, the existing Organizational Architecture, Financial
Infrastructure, and Macro Ecosystems need to change and be designed to co-exist. It’s time.
As the following chart shows, ASEM has been operating in
deficit since FY 1998 year, in which the health reform system based on the
universal third party payer system model was deployed in its medical facilities.
The third party reimbursement model is also in force for non-government insured
patients.
It’s not as complicated as we may perceive…
Providing health services to patients was part of ASEM’s
evolution, though its core business initiative was intended to sell critical
infrastructure services, to the specialized above-tertiary hospitals within the
Medical Center Complex, or Participating Institutions. But this concept slowly
miscarried.
The institutions were not only failing to pay ASEM for their
consumption on a timely manner, but were acquiring services with private
vendors. ASEMs service costs were slowly rising, mainly because of pricing
factors associated with employee salaries and/or benefits related with Union
Agreements which were truly costly arrangements in paper. The cash never existed. Indeed, part of the
critical economic history of the PR Administration for Medical Service. Plus,
the disintegration of the Arbona Healthcare System, in addition to the PR
Government Health Reform, the transfer rate to ASEM of patients from private
hospitals (41%) and the public policy of providing services to insured,
noninsured, john doe’s and alien patients, significantly deteriorated ASEM’s
liquidity situation. All factors caused patient mix to be driven by government
insured patients. Contracted rates with government reform insurers represent an
average of $.40 for each $1.00 invested, making it impossible for ASEM to
offset the financial impact of annual increasing health related costs and
required infrastructure, triggered by patient mix inelasticity, and the
existing economic structure.
A meeting of the minds within the Commonwealth, Department
of Health, Legislative and Executive branches, need to be consolidated. Only we are responsible for the
transformation of the Puerto Rico Health System, in a Non-Political manner. We
need to invest in healthcare, with a systematic business approach, focused on
prevention and wellbeing.
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